Misleading Advertising in Duopoly by 服部 圭介 & 東田 啓作
 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
Discussion paper No.69 
 
 
Misleading Advertising in Duopoly 
 
 
Keisuke Hattori 
Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics 
 
Keisaku Higashida 
School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University 
 
 
March 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY 
 
1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho 
Nishinomiya 662-8501, Japan 
Misleading Advertising in Duopoly
Keisuke Hattoriy and Keisaku Higashidaz
Abstract
In this paper, we build a model of strategic misleading advertising in duopolistic
markets with horizontal product dierentiation and advertising externality between
rms. We investigate the eects of regulating misinformation on market competi-
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rms, and social welfare. We show that the degree of advertising
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1 Introduction
In many developed countries, governments regulate misleading or false advertising and
encourage the provision of sucient information to allow consumers to make informed
choices. For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for
advancing public health by helping the public receive accurate, scientically based infor-
mation they need to consume medicines and food to maintain and improve their health.1
The Canadian Competition Bureau aims at ensuring veracity in advertising and prohibits
any deceptive representations for the purpose of promoting a product or a business in-
terest.2 In Japan, the Consumer Aairs Agency, ocially established in 2009, promotes
awareness of product quality to protect consumer benets.3 Directive 2006/114/EC of Eu-
ropean legislation directly regulates and controls misleading and comparative advertising
in the interests of consumers, competitors, and the general public.4
Nevertheless, misleading advertising is ubiquitous. It can be observed on TV, news-
paper, and other media because there exist loopholes in regulations.5 Firms engage in
misleading advertising to make consumers believe that the quality of their products is
higher than they truly are. For example, some menu photographs of fast food products
look better than the actual products. Another example includes vague description of the
use of food additives, chemicals in children's toys, and dubious promises of travel services
and accommodations.6
When misleading advertising makes consumers buy products that they would not have
bought without its inuence, it seems reasonable that the government should strictly pro-
hibit such advertising. However, when a product market is imperfectly competitive, there
is a problem of under-consumption of products, which implies that a positive amount
of misinformation may increase consumption and improve welfare (Glaeser and Ujhelyi
(2010)). Therefore, the welfare eects of some regulatory policies (e.g., prohibiting mis-
leading advertising, educating consumers, taxing advertising or production, and prohibit-
ing cooperative advertising between rms) may depend on the degree of product market
competition as well as on the magnitude of advertising costs. How should the government
regulate misleading advertising? Under what conditions would these regulatory policies
increase welfare? We attempt to address these questions in our study.
We build a model of strategic misleading advertising in duopolistic markets with hor-
1See http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm.
2See http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02776.html.
3See http://www.caa.go.jp/en/index.html.
4Directive 2006/114/EC denes misleading advertising as \advertising which, potentially or actu-
ally, misleads or aects the judgment of the consumer or which, for these reasons, is detrimental to a
competitor." For further detail, visit the website of this directive (http://europa.eu/legislation sum-
maries/consumers/consumer information/l32010 en.htm).
5Byrd-Bredbenner and Grasso (2001) investigated the eect of food advertising policy on televised
nutrient content claims and health claims of the FTC, which was implemented in 1994. Hansen and Law
(2008) analyzed the eect of truth-in-advertising regulation in the early twentieth century.
6Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) provides several other examples of misleading advertising.
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izontal product dierentiation and positive advertising externality between rms. Our
model modies and extends Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), which builds a model of Cournot
oligopoly with homogenous goods. Specically, we consider the following two-stage game:
In the rst stage of the game, each rm simultaneously chooses the amount of misleading
advertising that will make its own products appear to be of higher quality than they re-
ally are.7 The misleading advertising carried out by one rm is assumed to have positive
external eects on the demand for its rival's products to a certain degree. In the second
stage, rms compete in price (Bertrand) for horizontally dierentiated products.8 Con-
sumers are assumed to be naive in the sense that they are not aware of the true benets of
consuming the products,9 and are easily deceived by misleading advertising. For example,
they may be misinformed about the eectiveness of some medicine or the health eects
of eating fast food.
Within the above framework, we investigate the eects of various types of regulating
misinformation on market competition, rm behavior, and social welfare to address the
aforementioned issues. We show that the degree of product dierentiation between rms
and the magnitude of advertising costs (or level of consumer gullibility) play a crucial role
in determining regulation policies. In particular, the policies for prohibiting misleading
advertising, educating consumers, and taxing production are more likely to reduce welfare
when the degree of product homogeneity is high and/or the magnitude of advertising cost
is large. On the other hand, taxing misleading advertising and prohibiting cooperative
advertising between rms necessarily improve welfare.
We then extend the basic model by including two types of heterogeneities. First, we
consider a case of heterogeneous consumers, where naive and smart consumers coexist in
society, and investigate the impacts caused by changes in naive consumers. Interestingly,
we nd that an increase in the proportion of naive consumers stimulates rms' mislead-
ing advertising and therefore reduces not only naive consumers' utility but also smart
consumers' utility, although smart consumers are not at all deceived by misleading adver-
tising. This is because the increase in misleading advertising raises product prices, and
thus even smart consumers suer a loss from price increases. In other words, government
policy for educating naive consumers is also benecial to smart consumers because it will
reduce misleading advertising, which in turn lower the equilibrium price of a product.
However, an increase in smart consumers does not necessarily benet the society because
it exacerbates the problem of under-provision of products associated with an oligopoly
market.
Second, we incorporate the heterogeneous costs of production into the basic model. We
nd that a low-cost rm is likely to engage in misleading advertising more aggressively
7Quality investments are not considered in this study as they are considered to be relatively long-term
decisions. Instead, we focus on misleading advertising strategies, which are short-term decisions, taken
by wily entrepreneurs to deceive consumers.
8The results obtained in this study are also robust when we consider a quantity competition (Cournot)
instead of Bertrand competition.
9For a comprehensive survey of the economic analyses of advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
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than a high-cost rm. The dierence in the amount of misleading advertising may lead
to a seemingly paradoxical result of product misallocation: the price of low-cost rm's
product is higher than that of high-cost rm. In addition, we nd that social welfare
may decrease with the dispersion of marginal production costs due to the misallocation
of products.
The welfare eects of advertising and optimal regulatory policies have been exten-
sively investigated by Nelson (1974), Dixit and Norman (1978), Kotowitz and Mathewson
(1979), Becker and Murphy (1993), Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), among many others. Our
study is complementary to the recent contribution by Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), which
investigates the welfare eects of dierent regulatory responses to misinformation in a
model of Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods and misleading advertising. In their
model, advertising is a pure public good among rms because they produce homogenous
goods. Our current study deals with horizontal product dierentiation, and thus the
degree of positive externality in advertising among the rms is related to the degree of
product dierentiation. Our study also considers cost dierentials and other types of
policy responses, and nds signicant results regarding the relationship between welfare
eects of regulatory policies and the degree of horizontal product dierentiation.
Our model structure is similar to that of Garella and Petrakis (2008) who analyzes
the eects of minimum quality standards in oligopoly in a model of pure vertical dier-
entiation, in which product qualities are enhanced by a rm's ex-ante investment. In our
model, however, product qualities are made out to be enhanced (not really enhanced) by
a rm's ex-ante advertising. This dierence is crucial to evaluate the welfare consequences
of rm behaviors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model
and characterizes the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Section 3 examines several reg-
ulations: complete prohibition of misleading advertising, educating consumers, taxing
misleading advertising, taxing production, and prohibiting cooperative advertising cam-
paign. Section 4 extends the basic model by introducing two factors: heterogeneous
consumers and heterogeneous production costs. Section 5 presets the conclusion.
2 The Model and its Equilibrium
Consider two rms who each produces a horizontally dierentiated good and engages
in advertising activities. Prots of rm i (i = 1; 2) are i = (pi   c)xi   ks2i , where
pi represents the price of good i, c the (constant) marginal cost of the production, si
the advertising investment made by rm i, and k the cost parameter of advertising.
The advertising we consider is classied as persuasive advertising in that it may aect
consumers' preferences by enhancing the product's value in the consumers' eyes. However,
it diers from traditional advertising described in industrial organization literature in that
it is misleading advertising, which deludes consumers into thinking that the quality of the
advertised product is higher that it actually is. Therefore, we refer to si as the rm's
4
misleading advertising. In addition, the cost parameter k is also considered as the level of
consumer gullibility, where small (large) k implies that consumers are easily (not easily)
deceived by the rms' misleading advertising.
Following Singh and Vives (1984) and Garella and Petrakis (2008), consumers have
identical tastes, summarized by the following utility function:
U(x1; x2) = (+ e1)x1 + (+ e2)x2   (x21 + x22 + 2x1x2)=2 +m;
where xi represents the consumption of good i,  the true quality of the good i, ei
perceived incremental quality (i.e., misinformation) as a result of two rms' misleading
advertisement, m the consumption of other composite goods (or money), and  2 [0; 1]
the parameter indicating the degree of homogeneity (or substitutability) between the two
goods. The misinformation regarding good i, ei, is yielded from misleading advertising
investment of rm i and rm j. We assume
ei = ei(si; sj; );
where @ei=@si > 0, @ei=@sj  0, @ei=@sj = 0 when  = 0, and @ei=@sj = @ei=@si for  = 1.
The last two assumptions implies that one rm's misleading advertisement is more likely
to make its rival's goods look better as the degree of homogeneity between two goods
becomes higher. When the two goods are perfect substitutes ( = 1), the misleading
advertisement is public good for both rms. Specically, we assume a tractable form of
the function:
ei(si; sj; ) = si + sj:
The budget constraint of consumers is
P2
i=1 pixi +m = y, where y is the exogenously
given income of consumers. Then the utility maximization yields the following familiar
demand functions:
xi =

1 + 
+
ei   pi   (ej   pj)
1  2 ; for i = 1; 2; i 6= j: (1)
Note that misinformation about good j partly decreases the demand for good i.
The timing of events is as follows: in the rst stage, each rm decides on the amount
of misleading advertising needed to deceive consumers and persuade them to buy more;
in the second stage, rms compete a la Bertrand.
2.1 Equilibrium
We solve the model by backward induction. In the second stage, taking the other rm's
price as given, each rm simultaneously sets its price to maximize its prots. Then, the
second stage Nash equilibrium is characterized as follows:
pi =
(2 + )[(1  )+ c] + (2  2)ei   ej
4  2 ;
xi =
(2 + )(1  )(  c) + (2  2)ei   ej
(1  2)(4  2) :
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Thus, pi and xi are increasing in ei but partly decreasing in ej.
In the rst stage, each rm simultaneously chooses its level of misleading advertising
si, given the rival's choice. From the rst-order condition of prot maximization, we have
the following reaction function of rm i in choosing si against sj:
si = Ri(sj)  s0 + 2(1  
2)
k(4  2)2   4(1  2) sj; (2)
where s0 =
2(1  )(2 + )(  c)
k(4  2)2   4(1  2) : In order to ensure a unique and stable Nash equilib-
rium,10 we assume the following:
Assumption 1 For all  2 [0; 1], k > 2(1  
2)
(2  )2(2 + ) :
Using this assumption, we nd that the intercept of the reaction function (2), s0, is always
positive, and that the misleading advertising investments are strategic complements.11
In the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, misleading advertising, misinformation, out-
put, and price are as follows:
si =
2(  c)(1  )

; (3)
ei =
2(  c)(1  2)

; (4)
xi =
k(  c)(4  2)
(1 + )
; (5)
pi =
k(4  2)[(1  ) + c]  2c(1  2)

; (6)
where   k(2  )2(2 + )  2(1  2) > 0 from Assumption 1.
Result 1
The equilibrium misleading advertising s is monotonically decreasing in . The equi-
librium misinformation e is inverted U-shaped maximized at   0:34. Both s and e
become zero when  = 1.
Proof: Dierentiating (3) with , we have
ds
d
=  
2(  c)
h
k(2  )(2   + 22)  2(1  )2
i
2
< 0;
de
d
=  2k(  c)(12   4  
2   4)
2
R 0 ,  Q 0:34:
10The second-order condition is   2(k(4 2)2 4(1 2))(4 2)2 , therefore k > 4(1 
2)
(4 2)2 to ensure interior solutions
of si for i = 1; 2. Furthermore, the slope of reaction function should be less than unity to assure the
stability of Nash equilibrium, thus, k > 2(1 
2)
(2 )2(2+) , which is more restrictive to the former conditions.
11In detail, k > 0:274 is sucient for the equilibrium to be unique and stable.
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In addition, substituting  = 1 into (3), we have s = e = 0. 
An increase in the degree of homogeneity between two products () aects the rms'
incentives to engage in misleading advertising in two ways: it lowers the product prices
through increased price competition, which reduces the return on advertising; it increases
the incentives for free riding on the rival rm's misleading advertising through an increase
in its spillover eects. Thus, the misleading advertising is maximized when  = 0, which
indicates that a monopolist engages in the greatest amount of misleading advertising.
Now, we derive the equilibrium prots, consumer surplus, and welfare. The equilibrium
prots  can be obtained as:
 =
k(  c)(1  )[k(4  2)2   4(1  2)]
(1 + )2
: (7)
We distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post consumer surpluses. The ex-ante consumer
surplus cCS is dened as:
cCS = (+ e1)x1 + (+ e2)x2   (x12 + x22 + 2x1x2)=2 + y   p1x1   p2x2: (8)
Consumers can realize the true quality of the goods only after consuming them. Thus,
ex-post consumer surplus CS is dened as:
CS = x1 + x

2   (x12 + x22 + 2x1x2)=2 + y   p1x1   p2x2: (9)
Note that CS = cCS   (e1x1 + e2x2), where the second term represents the consumers'
disappointment regarding the quality of goods. Substituting (5) and (6) into (9), we
obtain the ex-post consumer surplus in equilibrium:
CS =
k(  c)2(4  2)[k(4  2)  4(1  2)]
(1 + )2
+ y: (10)
The consumer surplus should be measured based on the true quality of the product
because the advertising is misleading. Therefore, we dene social welfare as the sum of
equilibrium prots and ex-post consumer surplus: SW  = CS +
P2
i 

i .
12 We obtain
SW  =
k(  c)2
(1 + )2
+ y; (11)
where
 = k(4  2)2(3  2)  4(1  2)(6  2 + 2):
2.2 The second-best misleading advertising
Here we investigate the socially optimal (the second-best) level of misleading advertising
given the duopoly market structure. This can be obtained by maximizing the sum of
12We assume that the exogenously given income (y) is acquired from sources other than rms 1 and 2.
Thus,
P2
i 

i is not included in y.
7
ex-post consumers surplus and rms' prots in the second-stage equilibrium with respect
to s1 and s2. Then, we obtain the second-best amount of misleading advertising s
SB as
sSB =
(1  )(  c)
2k(2  )2 + (1 + )  0: (12)
Thus, we obtain the following results:
Result 2
The second-best misleading advertising sSB is monotonically decreasing in . The second-
best misinformation eSB is inverted U-shaped maximized at  = 10k+1 6
p
k2+k
8k 1 . Both s

and e become zero when  = 1.
Proof: dsSB=d < 0 is shown by dierentiating (12) in :
dsSB
d
=  2(  c)[k(2  ) + 1]
[2k(2  )2 + (1 + )]2 < 0:
The eect of changes in  on the second-best misinformation eSB = (1 + )sSB is:
deSB
d
=
(  c)[4k(2  5 + 22)  (1 + )2]
[2k(2  )2 + (1 + )]2 R 0 ,  Q
10k + 1  6pk2 + k
8k   1 : 
Result 3
s > sSB > 0 holds for all  2 [0; 1). s = sSB = 0 for  = 1.
Proof: Comparing (3) with (12) yields:
s   sSB =
8<:
(  c)(1  )(2  )[k(2  )2 + 2(1 + )]
[2k(2  )2 + (1 + )] > 0 for  2 [0; 1)
0 for  = 1
Thus, s > sSB necessarily holds for  2 [0; 1). 
Firms engage in ineciently excessive misleading advertising from the social welfare
point of view. Nevertheless, the second-best misleading advertising is positive. Although
misinformation causes consumers disappointment and thus reduces ex-post consumer sur-
plus, it mitigates the problem of under-provision of goods that results from oligopolistic
competition. Misinformation increases consumers' willingness to pay, raises the prices of
goods, and thus necessarily reduces ex-post consumer surplus. However, as long as the
misinformation is smaller than the second-best level, it will increase the prot of rms and
thereby override the negative eect of reducing consumer surplus.13 Figure 1 illustrates
the comparison of misleading advertising and misinformation between laissez-faire and
the second-best equilibrium.
13Needless to say, if all prots accrue to consumers, a small amount of misinformation improves welfare
without decreasing consumer surplus.
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Figure 1: Misleading advertising and misinformation: Equilibrium and the second-best
3 Regulating Misleading Advertising
In this section, we consider dierent policies for regulating misleading advertising: (i)
prohibiting misleading advertising; (ii) educating consumers; (iii) taxing misleading ad-
vertising; (iv) taxing production; and (v) prohibiting cooperative misleading advertising
between rms.
3.1 Complete prohibition of misleading advertising
Here we investigate the welfare consequences of complete prohibition of misleading ad-
vertising. In reality, it is dicult for policymakers to directly assign rms the upper limit
of misleading advertising to the second-best level due to its informational requirements.
Therefore, prohibiting or banning any misleading advertising is a viable policy option for
the government.
Under the policy, rms cannot engage in any misleading advertising, i.e., they set si = 0
for i = 1; 2. Then, equilibrium prots, consumer surplus, and welfare can be obtained by
CP =
(1  )(  c)2
(1 + )(2  )2 (13)
CSCP =
(  c)2
(1 + )(2  )2 + y (14)
SWCP = CSCP + 2CP =
(3  2)(  c)2
(1 + )(2  )2 + y; (15)
where superscript CP refers to the case of complete prohibition.
Result 4
Compared to the laissez-faire case, the complete prohibition of misleading advertising
(a) reduces rms' prots,
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(b) increases ex-post consumer surplus,
(c) enhances (reduces) social welfare when k and/or  are smaller (larger). Formally,
SWCP R SW  , k Q CP  (1 + )(3  2)
(2  )2 for  2 [0; 1):
Proof: From (7), (10), (11), (13), (14), and (15), we have
CP    =  4(  c)
2(1 + )(1  )2[k(2  )2   (1  )]
(2  )22 < 0;
CSCP   CS = 4(  c)
2(1  )2[k(2  )2(2 + ) + (1 + )]
(2  )22 > 0;
SWCP   SW  =  4(  c)
2(1  )2[k(2  )2   (1 + )(3  2)]
(2  )22 R 0:
When  = 1, the above three inequalities become zero. 
When the government prohibits any misleading advertising engaged by duopolists,
consumers are better o and rms are worse o unambiguously. However, the welfare
consequences of the policy depend on the value of k and . When consumers are easily
deceived by misinformation (i.e., k is small) and/or the products are highly dierentiated
(i.e.,  is small), the dierence between s and sSB is large, and thus the complete pro-
hibition policy works well. This is because the positive eect of the policy on ex-post
consumer surplus dominates the negative eect on rms' prots. On the other hand,
the degree of excessive advertising is mild when consumers are hardly deceived and/or
the products are highly substitutable. In this case, the policy's social costs of exacer-
bating the under-provision of goods that results from oligopolistic competition outweigh
its social benets from the disappearance of consumers disappointment. Figure 2 depicts
CP curve in    k plane. The region above (below) CP curve indicates SWCP < SW 
(SWCP > SW ).
3.2 Educating consumers
We then investigate the eects of a policy for educating consumers. As discussed in the in-
troduction, in many developed countries, governments and specialized agencies implement
policies to spread accurate information about product qualities to educate consumers. The
policy for educating consumers here is described as a marginal increase in k. In other
words, the policy costs more for rms to deceive consumers.14
From (11), we have the following result:
Result 5
Educating consumers
14We assume that no implementation costs are attached to the policy here, but the implications of the
results do not change qualitatively when considering such costs.
10
ΖCP
ΖEC
ruled out
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Degree of Homogeneity HΓL
A
dv
er
tis
in
g
Co
st
HkL
Figure 2: Welfare eect of complete prohibition and educating consumers
(a) reduces rms' prots,
(b) increases ex-post consumer surplus,
(c) enhances (reduces) social welfare when k and/or  are smaller (larger). Formally,
dSW 
dk
R 0 , k Q EC  2(1 + )(6  2   
2)
(2 + )(2  )2 :
Proof: Dierentiating (7), (10), and (11) in k, we obtain
@
@k
=  4(  c)
2(1  )2(1 + )[k(2  )2(2 + )  2(1  )]
3
< 0;
@CS
@k
=
4(  c)2(1  )(4  2)[k(4  2) + 2(1 + )]
3
> 0;
@SW 
@k
=  
4(  c)2(1  )2
h
k(2 + )(2  )2   2(1 + )(6  2   2)
i
3
R 0:
The last inequality proves assertion (c). 
Two points should be emphasized here. First, the result of @SW =@k > 0 cannot be
obtained if si would really enhance product qualities (e.g., quality investment like Garrella
and Petrakis (2008)) or if si would be informative advertising (e.g., Kotowitz and Math-
ewson (1979)). On the other hand, in our model setting, the amount of misinformation
is large in the case of lower k and/or , which indicates the positive eects of the policy
on consumer surplus are substantial. This positive eects dominate the negative eects
of increasing advertising costs and of reducing outputs. The situation is depicted by the
region below EC curve in Figure 2. Second, the result of @SW =@k < 0 is signicant
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because s > sSB necessarily holds in equilibrium. A decrease in k spurs rms to misin-
form more, but the benet of cost reduction dominates the loss of misinformed consumers
when k and/or  are large (initially small misinformation). The situation is depicted by
the region above EC curve in Figure 2.
3.3 Taxing misleading advertising
We consider a direct taxation of misleading advertising. Following Glaeser and Ujehlyi
(2010), it is modeled by the taxation of prots gross of advertising costs.15 When
advertising costs are not be deducted from the tax base, rms' prots after tax are
i = (1   )[(pi   c)xi]   k s2i , where  is the rate of prot tax. Tax revenues are
rebated to consumers in a lump-sum form. Then, the welfare maximizing prot tax SB
becomes
SB =
k(2  )2 + 2(1 + )
4k(2  ) + 2(1 + ) : (16)
Not surprisingly, each rm's misleading advertising under the tax scheme equals to the
second-best level sSB. Thus, the government can attain the second-best allocation by
using the prot taxation that does not deduct the advertising costs from the tax base.
Result 6
The second-best tax SB is
(a) decreasing in k,
(b) increasing (decreasing) in  for small (large) k.
Proof: Dierentiating (16) in k and  yields
dSB
dk
=   (1 + )(4  
2)
2[2k(2  ) + (1 + )]2 < 0;
dSB
d
=
k[4 + 2 + 2   2k(2  )2]
2[2k(2  ) + (1 + )]2 R 0 , k Q
4 + 2 + 2
2(2  )2 ;
where the rst and second equations prove assertion (a) an (b), respectively. 
The assertion (a) is intuitive. The more the cost for rms to persuade consumers,
the smaller their misleading advertising and the lower the tax to attain the second-best
allocation. The assertion (b) is slightly dicult to understand. The amount of misleading
advertising becomes small as  becomes large (Result 1). Therefore, the optimal adver-
tising tax seems to be decreasing in . However, the total output increases with the
degree of substitutability between goods . Thus, the disutility from misinformation also
increases with  for the given s. When the advertising costs are rather small, the amounts
of misinformation are large, so the disutility from the increase in outputs dominates the
utility gain from the decrease in misleading advertising.
15As an example of this type of tax schemes, Glease-Ujehlyi (2010) quotes the example of Prescription
Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) in the U.K.
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3.4 Taxing production
We investigate whether or not output taxation enhances welfare. The prot function of
rm i is modied by i = (pi   c  t)xi   k s2i for i = 1; 2. Then, the equilibrium amount
of misleading advertising can be obtained by
si =
2(  c  t)(1  )

;
which indicates that output taxation reduces rms' misleading advertising. If the tax
revenues are rebated to consumers in a lump-sum form, then the welfare maximizing
output tax is given by
tx =
(  c)(1  )[2(1 + )(8  (4 + ))  k(4  2)2]
8(1  )2(1 + ) + k(4  2)2 R 0 , k Q
2(1 + )[8  (4 + )]
(4  2)2 :
The above inequalities indicate that the welfare maximizing rate of output tax is positive
(negative) when the advertising costs are relatively small (large).16 Thus, we have the
following result.
Result 7
Taxing production improves (reduces) welfare if the advertising costs are relatively small
(large).
Note that in the absence of misleading advertising activities, taxing production in
oligopoly necessarily reduces welfare because it exacerbates the problem of under-provision
of products. However, taking rms' misleading advertising into account, taxing produc-
tion also reduces misleading advertising, which mitigates the problem of over-advertising.
When the advertising costs are small, the problem of over-advertising is more severe than
that of under-provision, and thus taxing production improves welfare.
3.5 Prohibiting cooperative misleading advertising
Here we consider whether or not cooperative misleading advertising between two rms is
benecial to society. We consider a horizontal cooperative advertising where the advertis-
ing is jointly projected by a group of rms that are horizontal competitors. For example,
dierent hotels in the same vacation city cooperatively advertise to improve the public
image of the city. We consider a case where rms cooperate in misleading advertising in
the rst stage, but they do not cooperate in price setting in the second stage. Sometimes
a certain industry or a production district as a whole engages in cooperative advertising
among many rms because advertising has positive externalities that enhance the image
of goods in the same category but provided by other rms.
16The welfare maximizing output tax (or subsidy) certainly converges to zero as  is close to 1, i.e.,
perfect competition case. For example, the critical value of k is 1 for  = 0, 1:23 for  = 0:5, 1:34 for
 = 0:9.
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As a result of maximizing joint prots in the rst stage, we obtain the following coop-
erative misleading advertising:
sC =
(1  )(  c)
k(2  )2   (1  2) :
From (3), we have
sC   s = k(  c)(2  )
2
[k(2  )2   (1  2)]
h
(1  )
i
;
which yields sC > s for  2 (0; 1), and sC = s for  = 0 or  = 1. Thus, we have the
following result for welfare evaluation of cooperative misleading advertising:
Result 8
Because sC > s > sSB holds for  2 (0; 1), the cooperative misleading advertising
between rms necessarily increases their prots, reduces consumers surplus, and reduces
social welfare.
The result implies that the government should regulate cooperative advertising cam-
paigns of rms if the advertising is considered misleading.
4 Extensions
In this section, we extend the model by considering two factors: heterogeneous consumers
and heterogeneous costs of production.
4.1 Heterogeneous consumers: naive and smart consumers co-
exist
We consider a case where a proportion  2 [0; 1] of consumers are naive as in the previous
section, but (1   ) of consumers are smart in the sense that they can identify the true
quality of goods without being inuenced by misleading advertising. We investigate the
eects of changes in the proportion of naive consumers on rms' misleading advertising
activities, prices of goods, and social welfare.
The aggregate demand for good i (the sum of the demand of naive and smart con-
sumers) is
xi =

1 + 
+
(ei   ej)  pi + pj
1  2 :
The case of  = 1 corresponds to (1). The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game
is characterized by
s =
2(  c)(1  )

; (17)
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xi =
k(  c)(4  2)
(1 + )
;
xsmi =
(  c)[k(4  2)  22(1  2)]
(1 + )
;
xnai =
(  c)[k(4  2)  2(1  )(1  2)]
(1 + )
;
pi =
k((1  ) + c)(4  2)  2c2(1  2)

; (18)
CS

=
(  c)2[k2(4  2)2   4k2(4  2)(1  2)  43(1  )(1  2)2]
(1 + )2
+ y;
CS
sm
=
(  c)2[(k(4  2)  22(1  2)]2
(1 + )2
+ y;
CS
na
=
(  c)2[k(4  2) + 2(1  )(1  2)][k(4  2)  2(1 + )(1  2)]
(1 + )2
+ y;
i =
k(  c)2(1  )[k(4  2)2   42(1  2)]
(1 + )2
; (19)
SW

=
(  c)2	
(1 + )2
+ y; (20)
where
 = k(2  )2(2 + )  22(1  2) > 0;
	 = k2(3  2)(4  2)2   42(1  2)
h
k(6  2   2) + (1  )(1  2)
i
:
The superscripts sm and na respectively represent the equilibrium variables of smart and
naive consumers. Note that both consumers surpluses are evaluated from an ex-post point
of view. Certainly, xnai +(1  )xsmi = xi and CSna+(1  )CSsm = CS. In addition,
the case of  = 1 is equivalent to the model analyzed in the previous section.
We nd from (17), that s = 0 for  = 0, and ds=d > 0, which indicates that rms'
misleading advertising is increasing in the number of naive consumers. We also nd the
following result:
Result 9
An increase in the number of naive consumers necessarily raise equilibrium prices (dpi =d >
0). Thus, it harms smart consumers as well as naive consumers, but is benecial to rms.
Proof: Dierentiating (18) and (19) in  respectively yields
dpi
d
=
4k(  c)(4  2)(1  )2(1 + )
2
> 0;
di
d
=
8k(  c)2(1  )2(1 + )[k(2  )2(2 + )  2(1  )2]
3
> 0:
The price increases necessarily reduce surplus of naive and smart consumers. 
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Figure 3: Welfare consequences of an increase in the number of naive consumers
An increase in the number of naive consumers makes rms engage in more misleading
advertising, while causing price increases. An interesting point here is that an increase in
the number of naive consumers aects the utility of smart consumers indirectly through
price changes although smart consumers never fall for misleading advertising.
Then we examine the eects of a change in the number of naive consumers on social
welfare. Dierentiating (20) in  yields
dSW

d
=
4(  c)2(1  )2 
3
R 0;
where
   2k2(2 + )(2  )2   23(1  )(1 + )2
 k[3(1 + )(2 + )(2  )2   4(1  2)(2  2)] R 0: (21)
The welfare consequence of a change in  depends on the sign of  . The sign of   cannot
be analytically solved easily. Therefore, we present the numerical results graphically in
Figure 3.
In Figure 3, dSW

=d = 0 curves for various value of k are depicted in     plane.
The region above (below) each curve indicates dSW

=d < 0 (dSW

=d > 0). Thus, we
have the following result.
Result 10
An increase in the number of naive consumers reduces (increases) social welfare when the
proportion of naive consumers is large (small), the degree of product homogeneity is small
(large), and the costs for misleading advertising are small (large).
The intuition is simple but revealing. When all consumers are naive ( = 1), the
amount of misinformation is socially excessive (Result 3). On the other hand, when
all consumers are smart ( = 0), the amount of misinformation becomes to zero and
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is socially insucient (Result 3). Thus, there exists a socially desirable proportion of
naive consumers in this environment. Likewise, the amount of misinformation is more
likely to be excessive when the products are more dierentiated or when the cost of
misleading advertising are smaller. The point to be emphasized here is that an increase
in the number of smart consumers does not necessarily benet the society because it
reduces rms' misleading advertising and thus exacerbates the under-provision of goods
associated with oligopoly outputs.
4.2 Cost heterogeneity
Here we extend the basic model by introducing the heterogeneity of marginal production
costs c, and examine its eect on the amount of misleading advertising, prices of goods,
and social welfare.
Suppose there are two rms l and h, where rm l (h) is the low-cost (high-cost) rm
who has ecient (inecient) production technologies. The prot functions of rms l and
h are respectively dened as l = [(pl   (c  )]xl   k s2l and h = [ph   (c+ )]xh   k s2h,
where  2 [0; c) represents rm h's cost disadvantages against rm l. The model is similar
to that in the previous section, except for the cost heterogeneity of rms.17 Consumers
are also assumed to be homogeneous and naive as in the basic model.
Then we obtain the dierence between equilibrium misleading advertising of rms l
and h:
sl   sh =
2(2  2)
k(2  )2(2 + )  (1  )(2  2) > 0:
Thus, we obtain the following result:
Result 11
Ceteris paribus, low-cost rm engages in misleading advertising more than high-cost rm.
The result implies that the smaller the marginal cost of production, the larger the
marginal revenue of misleading advertising. Then, we compare the resulting prices of the
two goods:
pl   ph =  
2(1  )[k(4  2)  (2  2)]
k(2  )2(2 + )  (1  )(2  2) R 0 , k Q
2  2
4  2 :
Thus, we have
Result 12
When the advertising costs are small (large), ceteris paribus, the price of a low-cost rm's
good is higher (lower) than that of a high-cost rm's good.
17Note that even a small cost dierence makes high-cost rm exit the market when the products are
highly substitutable. We consider the cost heterogeneity only in the case of interior solution (i.e., the
case where both xh > 0 and x

l > 0 hold in equilibrium.
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In the absence of misleading advertising, ceteris paribus, a low-cost rm sets the price
lower than its high-cost rival. In that case, the relatively low price would help consumers
understand that the rm has ecient production technologies. However, as shown in
result 12, the price of low-cost rm's good is higher than that of high-cost rm's good
when the costs of misleading advertising are relatively small. Thus, in this case, naive
consumers cannot know whether the apparently high prices are attributed to the rm's
inecient production or to its relatively large misleading advertising.
Next, we investigate the eects of the dispersion of marginal costs on total outputs.
The sum of equilibrium output of goods l and h is
xl + x

h =
2k(  c)(4  2)
k(2  )(2 + )2   (1 + )(2  2) ;
which is independent of . Individual outputs (xl and xh) are aected by the dispersion of
marginal costs, but total outputs are not. In fact, total outputs are a function of average
eciency, c = 1
2
[(c  )+ (c+ )].18 In addition, the sum of misinformation of goods l and
h is
el + e

h =
2(  c)(1 + )(2  2)
k(2  )(2 + )2   (1 + )(2  2) ;
which is also independent of . Thus, the sum of outputs and misinformation of two goods
are both independent of the cost variations between rm l and h.
Finally, we investigate the eects of cost dispersion on welfare.
dSW
d
=
2 k[k(3  )(4  2)2   2(2  2)(6  4   22 + 3)]
[k(2  )2(2 + )  (1  )(2  2)]2 R 0
, k R 2(2  
2)(6  4   22 + 3)
(3  )(4  2)2
Result 13
Social welfare increases (decreases) with the dispersion of marginal production costs when
the advertising costs are relatively large (small).
In the absence of rms' misleading advertising activities (i.e., sl = sh = 0 in equi-
librium), consumers surplus, producers surplus, and the social welfare increase with the
dispersion of marginal costs.19 This is because the cost variation allows the ecient allo-
cation of goods by increasing the demand for low-cost rm's goods and by reducing the
demand for high-cost rm's goods. However, in the presence of rms' misleading advertis-
ing, the demand for low-cost rm's goods becomes much greater because the misleading
advertising of low-cost rm's products is larger than that of high-cost rm's products
(Result 11). The eect becomes even stronger so that pl > ph if k is small (Result 12). In
that case, the more misleadingly advertised goods are allocated to consumers, leading to
18The result is generally known in I.O. literature. See Bergstrom and Varian (1985).
19This result is also shown by Salant and Shaer (1999), Fevrier and Linnemer (2004), and Jurgan
(2009).
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excessive consumer disappointment. Although the total outputs and misinformation are
independent of cost dispersion, the misallocation eects reduce ex-post consumer surplus,
and thus decrease welfare.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the eects of regulatory policies on misleading advertising in
duopolistic markets with horizontal product dierentiation. One important feature of
the model is positive advertising externality between rms, and the degree of externality
correlating with the degree of product homogeneity. We show that the degree of substi-
tutability between goods and the magnitude of advertising costs (or level of consumer
gullibility) are crucial factors in determining the welfare consequences of regulation poli-
cies. The welfare eects of prohibiting misleading advertising, educating consumers, and
taxing production with misleading advertising are not necessarily positive and depend on
these factors. On the other hand, taxing misleading advertising and prohibiting cooper-
ative advertising between rms necessarily improve welfare. The model is extended by
including two types of heterogeneities: heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous pro-
duction costs between rms. We show that an increase in the number of naive consumers
makes smart consumers worse o due to price changes, but it may improve social welfare.
In addition, the welfare eects of the dispersion of production costs depend again on the
magnitude of advertising costs (or level of consumer gullibility).
One conceivable extension of our analysis would be to investigate the eect of mislead-
ing advertising in a model of vertical product dierentiation. The incentives for engaging
in misleading advertising may be dierent between rms producing dierent quality lev-
els. In this case, regulations on misleading advertising may produce results dierent from
those found in this study. This awaits future investigation.
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